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Introduction 
This is a response to the BEIS Green Paper Modernising Consumer Markets by Peter 
Cartwright, Sam Dunleavy and Richard Hyde who are Consumer Law and Policy specialists 
at the Centre for Commercial Law in the School of Law at the University of Nottingham. 
We have not provided answers to questions that relate primarily to competition law 
(questions 8 and 17-21) which are beyond our expertise. 
We divided responsibility for the questions between us on the basis of our particular 
interests and expertise, but have each read the others’ responses and believe that the 
responses have benefited from that.  
 
1. In which regulated markets does consumer data portability have the most 
potential to improve consumer outcomes, and for what reasons? 
Data portability has the most potential to improve consumer outcomes where competition 
exists, but consumers are unable properly to choose the optimal provider without 
possession of the data held by the provider. Therefore, consumer data portability is 
important in areas such as financial services (including banking, insurance and pensions) 
telecommunications and energy.  
In insurance, data regarding consumers’ insurance requirements and insurance history 
could be used to better-match consumers to insurance appropriate to their level of risk. 
For example, where a motor vehicle insurance consumer has a telematics-based policy, 
the data captured should be made available to all other insurers in order that they can 
offer premiums based on this data. 
In telecommunications, details of consumers’ usage (and, in particular, the balance of 
usage in landline, broadband and TV bundles) should be portable to enable consumers and 
providers to identify an appropriate package. 
Data portability is unlikely to enhance outcomes in markets where there is no competition 
(such as water) or in transportation (where open availability of data about the services 
provided and price is important, but availability of data regarding consumer behaviour is 
less so). 
2. How can we ensure that the vulnerable and disengaged benefit from data 
portability?  
A starting point for addressing this is to think about what we mean by vulnerability. 
Consumers may be vulnerable in different ways and for different reasons. Research has 
suggested that it is possible to create a taxonomy of vulnerability which can identify (a) 
what makes consumers particularly vulnerable; and (b) how policymakers might address 
 2 
 
these elements of vulnerability.1 It is argued that consumers may be particularly 
vulnerable (and it should be remembered that vulnerability is relative) in terms 
information, pressure, access to products, ability to pursue redress and the impact that 
they face from making sub-optimal choices. These should be considered when assessing 
the impact of legal or policy change on consumers. 
The Green Paper rightly states that simply relying on engaging consumers by providing 
them with more information is not wholly effective. Although policy has seldom only 
provided information, there is general acknowledgement that too much faith has been 
placed in disclosure as a way of (a) ensuring that consumers make optimal choices; and 
(b) enabling consumers to discipline markets. Some consumers (whether we describe 
them as vulnerable, disadvantaged or less privileged) are particularly ill-served by policies 
that focus heavily on disclosure. 
Despite its limitations, information (broadly understood) may provide benefits for more 
vulnerable consumers. Providing information in a simple and user-friendly way alongside 
consumer education initiatives has a role to play. Simple, user-friendly information can 
contribute in particular to raising awareness but should be used alongside consumer 
education campaigns. Any initiatives should draw on behavioural science research to 
ensure, for example, that information is appropriately framed and that any over-optimism 
is accounted for. As the Green Paper rightly says we “need to take account of real-world 
behaviours and preferences”. 
However, to ensure there is appropriate engagement consumers need to have confidence 
to go alongside the awareness mentioned above. First, they need confidence that they will 
be treated fairly by those who have the data. There will be an understandable fear on the 
part of many consumers (and not just the particularly vulnerable) that their information 
will be used to maximise traders’ profits rather than save them money or improve the 
quality of the service they receive. As the Green Paper states: “too often this data works 
against consumers rather than for them”. Second, they need confidence that data will be 
secure. Recent high-profile breaches are likely to make many consumers feel vulnerable 
in this regard. Third, consumers need confidence about their own ability to make 
appropriate choices. The business model of the energy market is largely based around 
penalising consumers for inertia, and it is true that many consumers are aware of this. 
However, those consumers are not necessarily confident that switching will produce a 
better outcome. In 2017 over 5m energy customers were said to have switched supplier, 
and while this may indicate growing awareness and confidence it is still a relatively small 
minority of consumers. 
Automatic switching services, which use algorithms to identify the best moment to switch 
consumers onto a cheaper deal are an interesting development, with Ofcom trialling a 
collective switching service to move some customers to better value tariffs. A clear 
distinction needs to be drawn between initiatives which give consumers information upon 
which they can make a decision (say, to switch) and initiatives under which consumers 
authorise switching to take place whenever the algorithm underpinning the service deems 
it to be appropriate. The Government’s Smart Data Review needs to investigate the options 
in detail in the light of technological developments. It is extremely important that the 
                                           
1 P Cartwright “Understanding and Protecting Vulnerable Financial Consumers” (2015) 
38(2) Journal of Consumer Policy 119-138. 
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relevant regulator is robust in ensuring that firms take appropriate responsibility and treat 
their customers fairly. 
3. How can we ensure these new services develop in a way which encourages 
new entrants rather than advantaging incumbent suppliers? 
There are two main points to consider. First, data should be available in a single format 
that is readable without specialised software. It is suggested that CSV would be 
appropriate. Second, where possible, metadata and database architecture should be 
standardised so that all entrants to the market can utilise the data. 
 
4 (a) What is the best way to publish performance data so that it incentivises 
firms to improve and can be used by consumers when taking decisions?  
There may be different rationales for, and objectives of, publishing performance data. The 
performance of a firm is an element of the quality of the service provided by that firm. 
Service quality is frequently difficult for consumers to judge accurately, but is also a matter 
of significant importance to them. Performance data can be viewed through different 
lenses and can be seen to have a number of objectives including (but not limited to): 
(1) Helping consumers to make better-informed choices, particularly about quality; 
(2) Improving standards by incentivising firms to step up their performance; 
(3) Providing greater transparency for a range of stakeholders; and 
(4) In some cases, operating as a form of sanction (or as part of a sanction).2 
The objectives that are particularly pertinent to the specific regime always be remembered 
when designing the operation of that scheme.  
There are several ways to publish performance data and there will always be significant 
trade-offs with whatever arrangement is in place. This may be between simplicity and 
comprehensiveness, or between transparency and confidence (such as in parts of the 
financial sector). Because the data is intended to be acted upon, there is also a danger 
that it can to a disproportionate response in some cases and an inadequate one in others, 
for example because of the way that the information is disseminated and interpreted. 
Where information can be conveyed simply it is generally desirable to do so. For example, 
one strength of the National Food Hygiene Ratings Scheme is that the consumer can 
immediately see a score (in that case out of 5) which reflects an assessment (by an 
enforcer) of the extent to which the particular food outlet is compliant with food hygiene 
requirements. However, visibility and accessibility of information are also important, and 
one disadvantage is that under that Scheme there is no requirement for firms (at least in 
England) to display the score prominently on the premises. Consumers who want to 
discover an outlet’s core may have to search online, something that will be an obstacle for 
some consumers. Despite that, having the scores available should have some market-
disciplining effect even if not all consumers have access to the data. 
                                           
2 For a general discussion see P Cartwright “Publicity Punishment and Protection: the 
Role(s) of Adverse Publicity in Consumer Policy” (2012) 32(2) Legal Studies 179-201. 
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It is also important that the data is as reliable as possible. Another example of a scheme 
that involves publishing performance data is that operated by the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) on complaints about financial services firms. The FCA publishes data 
relating to complaints every 6 months. This is collected and published at an aggregate 
(market) and firm level. However, firm-specific data is only published for firms which 
report 500 or more complaints in a six month reporting period, or 1,000 or more in an 
annual reporting period. Those firms must also publish complaints data on their website.  
The FCA recommends that this can be used alongside data from the Financial Ombudsman 
Service “as an indicator of the quality of a firm’s complaints handling.” This is a matter 
which may be very important to consumers and may be an indicator of whether they are 
likely to be treated fairly. The publication of the data should give firms a clear incentive to 
improve not only the quality of complaint-handling, but also the quality of the underlying 
service which gave rise to the complaint in the first place. It is unlikely that many individual 
consumers peruse these data in detail. It is more likely that they read about some of the 
headline figures in the media. While potentially helpful, this runs the risk of the data being 
misused and misunderstood, as noted above. 
The Government has to determine which matters relating to performance are (a) likely to 
be important to consumers; (b) capable of being assessed fairly and accurately; and (c) 
capable of being communicated fairly and accurately. Although it is helpful if the 
information can be communicated accurately directly to consumers, as noted above, the 
information may still be valuable if respected third parties are able to analyse and 
disseminate it. 
A final point to note is that to be fair to firms, it may sometimes be necessary to provide 
contextual data with the information disclosed. One firm may look as though it performs 
poorly compared with a rival, but if there are sounds reasons why this is not a fair 
comparison it is important that such reasons are explained. 
 
4 (b) Should firms also offer discounts or compensation for poor performance? 
As a general principle it is right that consumers receive recompense where suppliers 
perform poorly. This should protect consumers’ expectation interest and exert competitive 
pressure on poorly performing suppliers which should help drive up standards. However, 
it is import for the concept of poor performance to be linked to some identifiable obligation 
owed to the consumer for the issue of the need for compensation to arise. Consumer rights 
to compensation already exist in the general law of contract and more specific consumer 
protection laws (such as Part 4A of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008). 
 
However, as the Green Paper acknowledges, low consumer engagement may weaken 
pressure on suppliers to perform even in markets where there are compensatory regimes 
in place to address poor performance, if these regimes rely on active consumer 
participation. Therefore, the trend towards reliance on automatic compensation schemes, 
which do not rely on active consumer engagement to create the incentive for suppliers to 
avoid poor performance, should be welcomed since they allow for competitive pressure to 
be exerted on suppliers without the need for consumers to complain first. This protects 
the interests of consumers who would not otherwise succeed in securing compensation for 
poor performance, which may be particularly beneficial to certain vulnerable groups. 
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There are already a number of automatic compensation schemes in operation and plans 
are in place to implement new schemes to cover broadband services and energy switching. 
It is submitted that new (mandatory) schemes could be considered for rail, flights and 
other transport services, as well as some areas of the banking sector (for example where 
internet banking services cannot be accessed for a period of time).  
 
Schemes will be most effective when they adhere to three general criteria; simplicity, 
consistency and fairness.  
 
In terms of simplicity, it is important for the obligation to pay compensation to be linked 
to easy to understand and objectively verifiable metrics. It must be clear what is meant 
by “poor performance” and when this is likely to have occurred; the triggers and levels of 
compensation associated with this must be readily quantifiable. This should allow 
customers to appreciate the aspect of poor performance which has given rise to any 
compensation payment and therefore to use that information when making future 
consumption choices. It will also allow firms, customers, and regulatory bodies to compare 
performance against the relevant standard. They will therefore know, on the basis of clear 
criteria, when performance has been poor and the implications of that in terms of the duty 
to compensate. If the payment of compensation is to have the effect of incentivising 
suppliers to perform better, the link between the level of performance and the obligation 
to pay compensation must be straightforward.  
 
Consistency is also important. The competitive pressure generated by an automatic 
obligation to pay compensation will be strongest where all suppliers are required to meet 
the same standards of performance which customers can then expect and rely on. In this 
regard, whilst voluntary schemes may be seen as a positive step towards better outcomes 
for customers in many sectors, the need for a mandatory compensation scheme covering 
all suppliers may be necessary to avoid patchy coverage which protects some consumers 
but not others. There is a risk that the new voluntary broadband scheme could be 
problematic in this respect, particularly if consumers do not fully understand the benefits 
of the scheme and therefore do not factor this into their choice of broadband supplier. 
Similarly, an array of different compensatory schemes currently operates across the rail 
industry. As a result, some customers will receive automatic compensation on some trains 
depending on how they purchased their ticket and what ticket they purchased, but other 
customers may need to actively apply for compensation. Equally, the standards of 
performance which give rise to a specific right to compensation under a particular scheme 
differ. Whilst it can be recognised that these differences arise in part due to different 
franchise agreements, which mean that changes to service standards may happen piece 
meal over a period of time, it is submitted that the lack of consistency has the potential 
to seriously disrupt the development of clear and consistent consumer expectations with 
regards to performance standards and suitable remedial action. A more consistent 
approach could bring benefits in terms of more robust customer expectations which in turn 
should produce clear incentives for suppliers to improve performance.  
 
Fairness is also an important consideration when designing automatic compensation 
schemes. The scheme should be fair both in terms of the obligation that it imposes on the 
supplier and the compensation that it awards to the consumer. With regard to suppliers, 
fairness can be achieved by designing schemes based on clearly defined standards of 
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performance over which the supplier has some control. Where performance is dependent 
in part on some other party, it should be possible for the supplier to secure compensation 
from that third party which corresponds to their obligation to the customer. However, it is 
important that this is passed on (there is some concern that rail operators do not always 
pass on the compensation that they receive from Network Rail, thereby granting them a 
windfall despite the poor performance experienced by customers).3  
 
With regard to consumers, fairness concerns the relationship between the poor 
performance experienced and the level of compensation received. As a general principle, 
the amount of compensation received should reflect the seriousness of the poor 
performance experienced. Payments for continuing poor performance or failure to 
automatically compensate promptly are a common feature of schemes currently in place 
and reflect good practice. However, there does seem to be scope for increasing some of 
the required payments under existing schemes to reflect the additional harm caused by 
repeat poor performance and failure to automatically award compensation. This should be 
designed to deter avoidance of obligations which would otherwise increase competitive 
pressure.  
 
One important point that should be considered when designing automatic compensation 
schemes is the effect that such schemes have on consumers’ other legal rights. It is often 
the case that compensation schemes reflect rather than expand existing consumer rights 
to compensation under contract law and/or other consumer protection laws. Automatic 
compensation schemes do, however, provide consumers with a valuable alternative to 
litigation. This is important because litigation frequently does not provide a realistic 
solution for consumer grievance. It is likely that the majority of consumers who experience 
poor performance will accept an automatic payment of compensation in lieu of seeking to 
further enforce their rights as consumers. In light of this, the level of compensation must 
reflect the fact that, as a default sum, this will supplant compensation that might otherwise 
be received as a result of other enforcement action. In this regard, monetary compensation 
will often be more suitable than discounts connected to the poorly performing supplier. It 
should also be made clear to consumers when they receive a compensatory payment of 
this kind that it does not override their other legal rights, and that where they have 
suffered additional loss they should contact the supplier and may be able to seek help 
from a relevant ombudsman or other ADR provider.  
 
Once effective automatic compensation schemes are in place, it is important for supplier 
compliance to be monitored. This cannot be left to consumers since they may not be aware 
of failures and given the expectation of automatic compensation may be unlikely to 
proactively seek recompense. 
 
5. Is there a need to change the current consumer advocacy arrangements in the 
telecommunications sector? If so, what arrangements would be most effective 
in delivering consumer benefits, including for those who are most vulnerable? 
                                           
3 ‘Train companies pocket millions in compensation while passengers endure 
cancellations’ The Telegraph 26 February 2018 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/02/26/exclusive-train-companies-pocket-
millions-compensation-passengers/ 
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It is clear that performance in some areas of the communications sector could be 
significantly improved. It is submitted that consumer advocacy may play an important role 
in bringing about change. The Communications Panel works closely with Ofcom to ensure 
that the consumer perspective is considered and they have produced some good research 
concerning the interests of vulnerable groups in this sector in particular. However, given 
the scope of the communications sector and its importance for consumers, it may be 
desirable for the work of the Panel to be expanded. For example, sub-panels or groups 
might be set up to work specifically on areas such as the broadband market or the mobile 
market. This would require more in terms of resources and personnel but would be worth 
the extra investment if it produces more research focusing on consumer experiences in 
this sector. This could increase understanding of the types of problems that consumers 
face and therefore may help Ofcom tackle the issues that cause consumer satisfaction to 
be relatively low.  
The role of other advocacy groups such as Citizens Advice and Which? must also be 
acknowledged. These groups have a strong public profile and may often have more ability 
than the Communications Panel to raise awareness of issues and therefore to generate 
pressure for change. In addition, these groups may have more scope to call for ambitious 
change to the status-quo since they are not restrained by the same practical 
considerations faced by Ofcom, and (because their close relationship with the regulator) 
the Panel. Supporting and engaging with these consumer advocacy groups is important 
and any steps that may be taken to strengthen the links between the Panel and such 
organisations should be considered (for example the power of the Secretary of State under 
the Communications Act 2003 to direct Ofcom to appoint an employee of Citizens Advice 
onto the Panel). 
Whatever consumer advocacy arrangement is adopted, it will need to operate within a 
broader system of tough regulatory action informed by rigorous analysis of the market in 
light of understandings generated by behavioural economics. An effective consumer 
advocate should be able to draw on research in other sectors to inform regulation and 
policy in its own sector. Research such as the FCA’s Financial Lives survey should be 
carefully considered in this regard. In addition, the Consumer Advocate should play a role 
in monitoring supplier performance and reporting on its findings. For example, the new 
automatic compensation scheme for broadband customers is a welcome step, but there is 
scope for it to be strengthened to include provision for poor performance where, for 
example, broadband speeds are consistently low. The Communications Panel could play 
an important role in monitoring the success of the new scheme and should make 
recommendations regarding how it should be developed in future. However, it must be 
noted again that a lack of capacity may limit the Panel’s effectiveness in this regard.  
 
6. How can the government support consumers and businesses to fully realise 
the benefits of data portability across the digital economy? 
The Government should provide platforms which enable businesses and consumers to 
access the data, and manipulate it to show the most appropriate products. This has the 
advantage of their only being one copy of the data (which is held securely on the platform) 
and reduces the need to build bespoke platforms for the reuse of data. 
The Government should consider specifying data standards and API information, or should 
actively work with industry to define data standards and API information. The open 
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banking standards could form the basis for such standards in other sectors. The 
Government should consider whether standards should be defined on a sectoral basis or 
more generally. 
7. As technology continues to develop, how do we maintain the right balance 
between supporting innovation in data use in consumer markets while also 
preserving strong privacy rights? 
Compliance with the requirements of GDPR is necessary. In particular, providers should 
ensure that the consumer knows what data is being shared and for what purpose. Article 
14(5) should not be used to prevent the service of notices under article 14. The use of a 
Databox (http://www.databoxproject.uk/) might be valuable – allowing consumers to 
choose what parts of their personal data that they share with the providers. 
 
9. Is the legal framework that covers consumer-to-consumer transactions 
appropriate to promote consumer confidence? 
The current framework for consumer-consumer transactions is defective in two respects: 
First, it is frequently not clear to consumers whether they are purchasing from a consumer 
or a business.4 The test whether an individual is a trader (and therefore whether the 
protections of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 apply) is based on information that may not 
(and indeed, in some cases, cannot) be known to the purchaser (and may not be known 
to a seller). This is particularly the case in online contexts (although it is perfectly possible 
that a consumer will be similarly confused in a face-to-face context such as a car boot 
sale). Whilst the protections provided by the repealed Business Advertisements 
(Disclosure) Order 1977 are broadly provided for by the Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations 1998, it is not clear that this broad protection is as efficient in ensuring 
that consumers are aware that a sale is made in the course of a business. Sellers may not 
be aware whether they are acting in the course of a business or not, and therefore cannot 
make an appropriate disclosure. In some cases platforms have put in place mechanisms 
to allow consumers to determine whether a seller is acting as a business or a consumer 
(for example eBay PowerSellers are likely to be businesses5), and this should be 
encouraged, but it is not always clear on all platforms, or in face-to-face interactions. 
 
Second, while the common law applies to the C-to-C transaction (so, for example, an 
inaccurate description of a product could amount to misrepresentation) there are no 
protections provided to the buyer in a C-to-C transaction insofar as it relates to the quality 
and fitness for purpose of the product. Caveat emptor applies, and therefore the risk is on 
the buyer rather than the seller. Whilst this may be justifiable in circumstances where the 
buyer has an opportunity to examine the product before making a decision to purchase 
(such as at a car boot sale) it is inappropriate when the product is purchased at a distance, 
where the consumer does not have the opportunity to examine the product in advance. 
Therefore, in order that consumers can buy with confidence, knowing that there is a 
minimal level of protection afforded to them, it is suggested that the following minimal 
level of protection be afforded to the buyer in C-to-C transactions: 
                                           
4 Compare Blakemore v Bellamy [1983] RTR 303 with Stevenson v Rodgers [1999] 2 
1064 1064 
5 A PowerSeller must have a minimum of sales volume of £1,000 per 12 months. 
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a. That the goods be of satisfactory quality. This requirement would mirror the 
requirement in the Consumer Rights Act, but in most cases the reasonable 
expectation of quality by the buyer would be lower in cases where the seller 
is a consumer rather than a trader. For example, however, the goods would 
not be of satisfactory quality in circumstances where they are unsafe, as a 
reasonable buyer in a C-to-C transaction would be entitled to expect that 
the product would be safe. It may not be reasonable to provide the buyer 
with a right to repair or replacement in a C-to-C transaction, but a short 
term right to reject would be appropriate. 
b. That the goods be fit for purpose where the purpose has been explicitly 
communicated to the seller prior to the purchase and the seller has 
confirmed fitness for purpose. This would be narrower than the fitness for 
purpose requirement that applies in B-to-C sales under the Consumer Rights 
Act 2015. 
c. Where the C-to-C transaction is at a distance consideration should be given 
to the possibility of a right to cancel. This could be more limited than the 
right afforded to consumers by The Consumer Contracts (Information, 
Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, for example in time.  
d. It should be a specific offence for a consumer knowingly to sell or offer for 
sale unsafe products. The definition of unsafe product should be the same 
as the definition in the General Product Safety Regulations 2005. However, 
in the C-to-C context the offence should not be committed on a strict liability 
basis. 
e. Consideration should be given to extending the protections of the Consumer 
Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations Part 4A. Whilst buyers in C-to-C 
transactions have the protection of common law doctrines such as 
misrepresentation, duress and undue influence, the difference between the 
protections and remedies depending on the identity of the seller might be 
thought to be problematic. 
 
 
10 (a) In what circumstances are personalised prices and search results being 
used? 
Personalised pricing is not a new phenomenon but the rapid development of data gathering 
and processing capabilities has significantly increased the potential opportunities for 
suppliers to adopt personalised pricing strategies as a means of exploiting information 
regarding consumers’ willingness to pay. This issue arises predominately in relation to 
online interactions. However, it should be noted that data can be gathered and utilised in 
other ways, for example, through the use store cards or loyalty schemes which target 
consumers with products and discounts based on their observed shopping behaviours.  
Despite some high profile anecdotal stories of suppliers using personalised pricing 
strategies, there is currently a significant lack of understanding regarding the extent to 
which personalised pricing is being used. It is clear that some suppliers have the technical 
capabilities to adopt complex personalised pricing practices, however detailed market 
study is required to investigate whether and how suppliers are using those capabilities. 
The OFT’s attempt to gather information on this topic was significantly limited by the lack 
of response it received from suppliers.  More rigorous investigation is needed to ensure 
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that policy makers and regulatory bodies are able to keep up with developments in 
markets.6 The CMA’s plan to develop a Digital, Data and Technology team is to be 
welcomed in this regard (CMA Annual Plan 2018/19).7 
10 (b) In which circumstances should it not be permitted?  What evidence is 
there of harm to consumers? 
Personalised pricing can be beneficial to consumers. It can allow suppliers to offer 
consumers more of what they want at prices which they are willing to accept. In this regard 
there is the potential for greater efficiency. However, personalised pricing practices also 
present certain risks particularly with regards to the increasing potential for very 
sophisticated profiling and targeting of consumers.  
In some circumstances personalised pricing may lead to increased price complexity, 
rendering it difficult for consumers to know when they are being offered the best price. 
This may weaken competition if it reduces price comparison and therefore switching 
behaviour. It also poses significant risk to the trust that consumers have in online markets 
which was a particular concern of the OFT when they investigated this issue is 2013 
(OFT1489).8 
In addition, personalised pricing could be particularly problematic for those who are not 
able to manage their online profiles well which could lead to certain vulnerable groups 
paying higher prices than those able to manipulate the information suppliers can gather. 
Further problems include inaccurate profiling leading to irrational price offers and punitive 
(high) prices for those who choose not to share data with suppliers (this may be 
understood as a form of opt-out penalty) or for those who  have little by way of online 
profile for suppliers to exploit. It may also be difficult for regulators to identify instances 
of unfairness associated with prices where each price is unique and offered temporarily to 
a consumer based on complex data profiling.    
In light of the risks associated with personalised pricing the CMA’s focus on this topic is to 
be welcomed9 as is the focus on consumer trust in the strategic steer. As this aspect of 
the consumer protection landscape develops it is hoped that more research and analysis 
will lead to a much more detailed understanding of personalised pricing, the risks 
associated with it, and the appropriate regulatory response.  
In the meantime, it is important for current laws which touch upon the issue of 
personalised pricing to be enforced. The includes the requirements of the GDPR which 
should allow consumers to understand how and why their data is being used, including 
use for applying personalised pricing. The prohibition of unfair commercial practices may 
also be relevant if suppliers pricing practices are misleading or aggressive.  
However, there will be instances in which a personalised pricing practice falls into a grey 
area between these provisions and judicial interpretation may be needed before a clear 
                                           
6 OFT, Personalised Pricing (May 2013, OFT1489)  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402165101/http:/oft.gov.uk/shared_of
t/markets-work/personalised-pricing/oft1489.pdf  
7 CMA Annual Plan 2018/19 (March 2018, CMA75) 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachme
nt_data/file/704594/Annual_Plan-201819.pdf  
8 Personalised Pricing (above) 
9 CMA Annual Plan (above). 
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legal picture emerges. In addition, current transparency requirements may not be enough 
to bring instances of personalised pricing to the attention of consumers given the fact that 
privacy policies are rarely engaged with. One improvement that may be made to the 
current regime to respond specifically to the issue of personalised pricing would be a 
requirement for increased transparency whenever it is used. As a basic requirement 
suppliers could be made to disclose the fact that a price is a personalised price. This could 
be done by displaying a prominent icon or text in a way which responds to consumers’ 
behavioural practices (recent research at the University of Nottingham has demonstrated 
the significance of consumer behavioural response to information located on web pages).10 
Additionally, suppliers could be required to provide an explanation of the data variables 
relied on to inform that price. This would provide scope for personalised pricing practices 
to develop, but would also give consumers the ability to make a fully informed choice 
regarding whether to accept or reject a price offered in light of the logic underlying it. 
Consumers could then use that information to search for better prices or to adapt their 
online profile to allow them to get better prices in future. Whilst existing rules may provide 
this form of protection in some circumstances (depending on their legal interpretation) it 
is submitted that a clear and specific addition to these rules could offer a firmer footing on 
which to allow personalised practices to evolve.     
 
11. Should terms and conditions in some sectors be required to reach a given 
level of comprehension, such as measured by online testing? 
A copy of a forthcoming article (Conklin, Hyde and Parente 2018) is attached. The findings 
are summarised below, but the reader is advised to consult the article in full. Further 
outputs form the project on reading behaviour of consumers are available from the authors 
of the study (kathy.conklin@nottingham.ac.uk or richard.hyde@nottingham.ac.uk). 
This article argues that while reading scores may be a useful tool in determining whether 
a contractual document reaches an appropriate level of transparency, they cannot be the 
only tool used. Reading scores alone should not be relied upon by business, regulators or 
courts in determining that contracts are transparent and, particularly, determining that 
they can be understood by consumers. Whilst readability measures can alert the writer of 
a text as to its relative complexity, they cannot identify specific processing and 
comprehension bottleneck, and they cannot identify situations when the text is expressed 
in too simple language to properly convey the economic effects of the contract to the 
average consumer. They may be useful for simple self-diagnosis by drafters who wish to 
identify whether their contract is too complex; but they cannot identify whether an average 
consumer will be able understand the contractual clause and to reason on that basis. 
Further, such tools look at the entire contract; they do not identify particularly problematic 
clauses which may be found in generally readable contracts, or the transparent clauses 
that do not need amended in a complex, difficult to read, document. 
                                           
10 Kathy Conklin, Richard Hyde, Fabio Parente and Kay Snowley, Consumer behaviour 
and ICSS: Exploring how consumers respond to Information, Connection and 
Signposting Services (January 2018) https://psauthority.org.uk/-/media/Files/PSA/For-
Businesses/Resources/Consumer-behaviour-and-ICSS-Exploring-how-consumers-
respond-to-ICSS.ashx?la=en&hash=ACE521A3348ADED0F7346DA4459CD6FEBE38D316 
See also Kathy Conklin, Richard Hyde and Fabio Parente, ‘Assessing Plain and Intelligible 
Language in the Consumer Rights Act: A role for reading scores?’ (2018) forthcoming 
Legal Studies (attached) 
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Online testing tools may be able to identify whether a contract is expressed in plain 
language, but they cannot necessarily assess its intelligibility. Assessing whether a 
contractual clause is expressed in plain and intelligible language requires the synergistic 
use of other methodologies that can more directly probe the processing and understanding 
of texts on the part of the reader. In this sense, a typical paradigm might involve the use 
of methods to evaluate the ways that consumers read texts, and comprehension questions 
to assess understanding and retention of information. Such an approach is unlikely to 
provide the simple, cheap, answers that reading scores might, but is more likely to gauge 
appropriately both the plainness and intelligibility of text by being able to consider both 
how the average consumer reads, and how a particular consumer reads. This is particularly 
important where a contract is either targeted at vulnerable consumers, or is likely 
particularly to affect vulnerable consumers. This is because the online tool is premised on 
determining the level of readability of a document; it does not consider whether the 
document would be able to be understood by a likely reader. This is a function that must 
be undertaken by a regulator, who needs to determine the appropriate standard that a 
contract should reach. Also, this should be context-specific rather than legislatively 
uniform for every contract in a particular sector.  
Further, if reading scores are to be used, the tendency for different measures and different 
calculators to rely on various assumptions points to the need for an analytic approach that 
can at least partly offset these biases. Using only one indicator or calculator enables those 
who understand the calculation methodology to draft based on achieving a particular 
score, rather than with the aim of achieving transparency. The different mechanisms for 
syllabalisation in the various online calculators mean that there can be large variations in 
the scores achieved by the same contract for the same indicator depending on the different 
calculator used. The use of a Grand Weighted Mean, as used in the paper, or at least an 
online tool that is not based on a single reading score methodology, is to be encouraged.  
 
12. How can we improve consumer awareness and take-up of alternative dispute 
resolution?  
The first point to note is that there is no shortage of ADR Schemes. Research by Queen 
Margaret University and the University of Westminster for Citizens Advice identified 147 
schemes across a wide range of sectors.11 However, only 15% of consumers polled had 
heard of the term “alternative dispute resolution” and an assessment of the arrangements 
led the authors to conclude that “the consumer ADR landscape now appears more complex 
and confusing than ever”.12 
As implied by the consultation question, a distinction should be drawn between awareness 
and take up. There needs to be a push to raise awareness of ADR through a number of 
initiatives.  
First, there is a case for a consumer education campaign. Advertising has raised awareness 
of some consumer protection programmes such as the Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme.  
                                           
11 C Gill et al Confusion, Gaps and Overlaps (CAB, undated). 
12 Ibid p 30. 
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Second, traders could be obliged to do more to publicise ADR (although as will become 
apparent, this is problematic). The present system is highly unsatisfactory. The ADR 
Directive was implemented in the UK by the Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer 
Disputes (Competent Authorities and Information) Regulations 2015. The intention of the 
Directive was that for all disputes between the trader and the consumer there would be a 
low-cost, simple and fast dispute resolution mechanism, but this is not the case. In some 
sectors, participation is ADR is mandatory; in others, it is not. Where traders are obliged 
to be part of an ADR service by law (for example in financial services) or by the terms of 
trade association membership, they are required to indicate this on their website and in 
their standard terms and conditions. This is beneficial, even if consumers are not always 
aware of precisely the benefits that ADR brings. However, where traders are not obliged 
by law to use ADR significant difficulties arise. The trader is obliged to inform the consumer 
about the possibility of ADR when the dispute arises, but not to use it. There is a danger 
that informing the consumer of the existence of ADR in this is misleading given the 
possibility of traders (lawfully) refusing to adopt ADR or follow findings. As one Report on 
ombudsmen bluntly put it: “Currently firms are required to say what the approved ADR 
scheme is in their sector even if they will not work with it, thus giving false hope to 
consumers. This rule is a farce.”13 
In terms of take-up, it goes without saying that this is likely to be greatest where ADR is 
(a) advertised clearly; and (b) compulsory. Outside compulsion, it is necessary for firms 
voluntarily to commit to ADR in order for consumers to be able to take it up. Where ADR 
is not compulsory, there need to be better incentives for firms to commit to it. At present, 
it is not clear that there is much competitive advantage for firms to do that. Of course, 
greater awareness might lead to more consumers’ choosing firms who commit to ADR. In 
time, therefore, it is possible that the market could lead firms to see competitive 
advantages in becoming involved. However, this does not seems particularly realistic. 
There have been sectors were consumers have regularly chosen firms which have 
committed voluntarily to schemes (such as those that were ABTA members) but that tends 
to have been where there was a very clear benefit to the consumer in doing so. A 
commitment to ADR does not seem to be in that category. 
13. What model of alternative dispute resolution provision would deliver the best 
experience for consumers?  
There is a significant body of literature on ADR and it is important for the Government to 
engage with that. This brief response cannot do justice to the wealth of material available. 
However, a few reflections are provided below. 
To deliver the best experience for consumers, ADR (among other things) should be: highly 
visible (see q.12), comprehensive in terms of their coverage, respected by consumers and 
firms (and hopefully a little feared by the latter), cheap (and preferably free) to use, able 
to deliver decisions promptly, staffed by experts and able to deliver justice on the basis of 
what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances. 
A good example of ADR is the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS). FOS emerged out of 
a number of self-regulatory ombudsman schemes (including the Banking Ombudsman and 
Insurance Ombudsman) which had already developed a reputation for being fair to 
consumers. FOS is very different from those earlier schemes. However, it has managed to 
                                           
13 MoneySavingExpert Sharper Teeth (2017). 
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maintain a reputation of being consumer-friendly, accessible and authoritative. It is 
obligatory for (most) financial services firms to join. 
In February 2017 MoneySavingExpert.com was asked by the Chair of the All-Party 
Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Consumer Protection to produce a report for the 
Group on the effectiveness of ombudsmen. The final report was presented to the APPG in 
November 2017.14 The Report focuses on ombudsmen rather than ADR more generally 
and it is not clear to what extent the conclusions are more generally applicable to ADR. 
The Report was highly critical of Ombudsmen and this is in contrast to some other recent 
reports on ADR. For example, it found that 53% of people who had used an ombudsman 
said they were put off using one ombudsman again. By contrast, a report by ICF Consulting 
for BEIS (Resolving Consumer Disputes) found that 69% of consumers were likely to use 
ADR again if they experienced a similar problem in future.15  
 
Sharper Teeth made a number of recommendations which are worthy of consideration: 
 
First, it recommended that all ombudsmen should have a statutory basis to ensure that 
“firms are cooperative with processes and compliant with decisions that have real legal 
teeth.” It is true that some ADR Schemes do lack teeth, and there is some dispute in the 
literature about the extent to which, once a recommendation or decision has been made, 
a firm might ignore it. Where there are close workings between ombudsman and regulator 
(for example between FOS and the FCA) it may be that the latter is able to deploy the 
considerable enforcement powers at its disposal. 
 
Second, it suggested that oversight of ombudsmen should be boosted to address matter 
such as: the ease of complaining; the speed of processing complaints; and the perception 
of fairness. The issue of “perception of fairness” is particularly challenging. There is a sharp 
contrast in the views that consumers hold of some schemes and also a striking relationship 
between satisfaction, perception of fairness and outcome. Resolving Consumer Disputes 
found that in cases where the ADR provider decided in favour of the consumer 83% of 
consumers perceived the process to be fair. By contrast, where the decision was either for 
the trader or a compromise this figure was 17%.16 According to the data in Resolving 
Consumer Disputes, 60% of ADR cases are settled in favour of the consumer 11% in favour 
of the trader and 10% involve compromise.17 
 
Third, it was suggested that the 8-week rule (the common requirement that unless a 
consumer receives a deadlock letter s/he needs to wait 8 weeks before using the 
ombudsman should be shortened to between 2-4 weeks (with for those in crisis). It is not 
just the delay in being able to bring a case to an Ombudsman that it of concern, but the 
delay (whether the case is one of an ombudsman or other forms of ADR) in bringing the 
dispute to a conclusion. Resolving Consumer Disputes found that relatively large shares of 
respondents said that the process took longer than they anticipated and criticised the lack 
                                           
14 Ibid. 
15 Resolving Consumer Disputes: Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Court System 
Final Report (BEIS, April 2018). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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of communication and information they received. Most people spent between three and 
nine months in the ADR process.18 
 
Sharper Teeth also contained an aspiration: that “all companies in consumer sectors would 
be members of an ombudsman”. The need for compulsion is noted at various points in this 
response. 
 
Sharper Teeth recognises that the rather bleak picture it paints results in part from the 
fact that its respondents self-selected to take part and that people who have a complaint 
to make were more likely to participate). This can be contrasted, for example, with the 
Confusion, Gaps and Overlaps which sought the views of 2,109 members of the general 
public, just 34 of whom had actually used ADR. A brief note of some of that Report’s 
conclusions also reveals a case for change.  
 
First it identified significant gaps despite the proliferation of ADR schemes. Second it 
identified overlaps, observing that where there are multiple and overlapping schemes 
consumer confusion is likely to result. This led the authors to describe the ADR landscape 
as “more complex and confusing than ever before.” Like Sharper Teeth, Confusion Gaps 
and Overlaps points to ways in which ADR is not consumer-focused. As already noted, a 
major problem is lack of compulsion. It cites Causton where he says: “everyday, ADR 
providers receive hundreds of enquiries from consumers eager to engage in ADR, only to 
be disappointed because businesses are not engaging, particularly in the retail sector.”19. 
If the trader indicates willingness to use ADR, the consumer can then choose whether to 
use it, and this is beneficial. But trader engagement is undoubtedly very low. To take the 
Consumer Ombudsman as an example: as of January 2018 it had just 30 participating 
companies and it only resolves complaints about companies which participate in the 
scheme. RetailADR (formerly the Retail Ombudsman) has fewer than 50. 
 
14. How could we incentivise more businesses to participate in alternative 
dispute resolution?  
It would be best if firms were obliged to belong to authorised ADR schemes. Confusion, 
Gaps and Overlaps concluded that: “The government should adopt the principle that 
participation in ADR should be mandatory across all consumer sectors, regardless of the 
sector involved or the value of the claims consumers are making.” This would, at a stroke, 
address the issue of participation by businesses.  
Short of compulsion, there are ways in which firms might be incentivised to join ADR 
Schemes, some of which have been touched on above. One is to do more to advertise 
those who have signed up, and to draw attention to those who have not. Organisations 
such as Which? consumer journalists and others might legitimately ask major firms why 
they have not subscribed to an ADR Scheme. As noted above, where there is greater 
consumer awareness there is a better opportunity to impose market pressure. Firms will 
be more likely to sign up if there is a benefit in doing so and a detriment to their not doing 
so. As noted above in the discussion of performance data, transparency is generally 
beneficial: shining light on firms, provided it is done in a fair and balanced way, can 
                                           
18 Ibid. 
19 P Causton “The ADR Directive – Airline Complaints and the Civil Aviation Authority – 
Journey to Nowhere” (2016). Cited in Confusion Gaps and Overlaps. 
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contribute to behaviour changing for the better. Unfortunately, without more consumers 
taking action through the courts or calling out poor performance on social media, firms 
may conclude that there is little to be gained by using ADR as complaining consumers are 
likely simply to go away.  
One of the main difficulties in the consumer protection landscape is its lack of bite. This 
results in large part from a lack of capacity on the part of enforcers. Trading standards 
have some of the legal powers that they need to deal with breaches is some areas. For 
example, misleading and aggressive practices and in theory be tackled informally, by civil 
enforcement or by prosecution. However, enforcers lack the resources to bring 
enforcement action as a matter of routine. If that were addressed, firms might be more 
inclined to participate in ADR for fear of something worse. This will not address all disputes 
by any means (and most of the disputes that are likely to go to ADR are contractual rather 
than regulatory). However, proper resourcing of trading standards is vital to make the 
overall consumer law landscape work. 
 
15. Should there be an automatic right for consumers to access alternative 
dispute resolution in sectors with the highest levels of consumer harm?  
 
The transaction costs involved in traditional dispute resolution (particularly litigation but 
also self-help/voice to trader) are a significant barrier to achieving access to justice. 
Mandating ADR would help to address this for the reasons discussed above. 
 
In the event that the Government is unwilling to mandate ADR then, at a minimum, it 
should mandate it in sectors with the highest levels of consumer harm. It should be 
remembered that when assessing harm account should be taken of several factors. This 
includes (but is not limited to): the number of consumers affected; the extent of the harm 
or loss; and the nature of the consumer or consumers affected (for example whether they 
are likely to be classed as particularly vulnerable).  
 
16. What changes are needed to ensure local and national enforcers work 
together within an effective framework for protecting consumers?  
Enforcers work hard to protect consumers under very difficult circumstances. The cuts that 
local authorities (in particular) have suffered have had a significant impact upon the ability 
of trading standards officers to take enforcement action. The lack of capacity is truly 
worrying for anyone concerned about the protection of consumers.  
One of the most interesting proposals in the Green Paper is for civil courts to impose 
financial penalties for breaches of consumer law. A Civil Enforcement Pilot was undertaken 
by the Office of Fair Trading and there was some enthusiasm at the time for embracing 
some of the powers recommended by Professor Richard Macrory in his report.20 Macrory 
recommended that enforcers have access to a toolkit that included variable monetary 
penalties and it is pleasing that the Government’s proposal is that they should operate 
alongside other civil remedies such as injunctive relief, enforcement orders and enhanced 
consumer remedies. 
                                           
20 R Macrory Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective (HM Treasury, 2006). 
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The Government considered implementing administrative sanctions in the Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 for Consumer Law in 2012, and while it concluded 
that it would impose the lowest costs of the available options, it was concerned that “there 
is a perception that it would not provide businesses with a fair hearing before sanctions 
are imposed.”21 It is, of course, important to ensure that there are appropriate procedures 
to protect firms under the proposals, and as any penalties will be imposed by the courts 
this seems unproblematic (although firms will, of course, want to see the detail). The 
Green Paper states that the power “will discourage infringements and promote prompt 
swift compliance with the law when a breach has been identified.” The discouraging of 
infringements – what we might call deterrence – is a very important element in an effective 
consumer protection regime. Its success depends not only on the availability of dissuasive 
sanctions but also on enforcers having the capacity to bring cases before the courts. The 
importance of making appropriate resources available cannot be overstated. 
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21 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Civil Enforcement Remedies (2012). 
